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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal by Appellant-Plaintiff-Counterdefendant, Farm Bureau Mutual
Insurance Company of Idaho, ["Farm Bureau"], from the district court's grant of summary
judgment to Defendants-Counterclaimants-Respondents on an issue of insurance coverage in an
underinsured motorist claim ["UIM"]. The claim involved an insured decedent's personal
representatives and adult children making an underinsured motorist claim against decedent's
auto policy. Farm Bureau denied the claim because Defendants were not defined as insureds in
the underinsured motorist part of the policy as they were not named insureds and were not living
at decedent's residence. R p. 229.

B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT
Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Appellant, Farm Bureau, filed a Complaint, and then an
Amended Complaint for declaratory relief against Defendants-Counterclaimants-Respondents
Michael John Eisenman, Kathryn Marie, individually and co-personal representatives of the
Estate of Patricia Eisenman, Rebecca L. McGavin and Peter Eisenman, individually
["Defendants"]. R p. 4 and 8. The Amended Complaint asked the district court to determine the
issue of claimed coverage of a part of the under insured motorist coverage in the policy. R p. II.
Defendants then filed an answer and a counterclaim against Farm Bureau for breach of contract.
Rp.60.
After a short period of discovery, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on
the insurance coverage issue. R p. 80. Farm Bureau then filed its motion for summary judgment
on the insurance coverage issue. R p. 240. District Judge Michael McLaughlin conducted a

1

hearing on the motions for summary judgment. Tr p. 5 - 37. Judge McLaughlin took the matter
under advisement and filed a Memorandum Decision. R p. 266. Judge McLaughlin ruled in
favor of Defendants and against Farm Bureau. R p. 273. From that ruling, Farm Bureau filed its
timely notice of appeal to this Court. R p. 278.

C. STATEl\1ENT OF FACTS
Farm Bureau sold a policy of insurance to Insured, decedent Patricia Eisenman. R p. 9.
The policy was a Farm and Ranch Squire policy which combined coverage for the farm, home,
equipment, and automobiles. R p. 13 - 54. Section III of the policy, the automobile insurance
coverage part, included insurance for uninsured and underinsured motorists in Coverage P and P1. R p. 43 - 46. On November 30,2007, Mrs. Eisenman was walking to a concert at her church
near downtown Boise. As she crossed the street, she was struck by an auto driven by Mary
Zahm. R p. 267. Ms. Eisenman died of her injuries. Id. The driver was convicted of vehicular
manslaughter. Id.
Two of Ms. Eisenman's adult children became personal representatives of her estate. R p.
153.A claim was made by the personal representatives of Ms. Eisenman's estate against the auto
insurance of the driver. R p. 267. The driver's insurer paid the policy limit of liability insurance,
$50,000. Ms. Eisenman's surviving adult children retained counsel who made a claim against
Mrs. Eisenman's Farm Bureau policy. Farm Bureau paid an accidental death benefit, pursuant to
the policy, to the estate. R p. 222. After some time, Defendant's current counsel was retained.
Subsequently, one of Ms. Eisenman's personal representatives, made a claim to Farm Bureau
under the underinsured motorist coverage part of Ms. Eisenman's policy. A sworn proof of loss
was presented to Farm Bureau. R p. 138. The sworn proof of loss also requested the policy limits
of Ms. Eisenman's under insured motorist coverage which were $500,000. R p. 139. Farm Bureau
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paid, in addition to the accidental death benefit, the hospital, medical, and funeral costs for Ms.
Eisenman to the personal representative's attorney under a separate coverage part. R p. 224.
The medical and funeral expenses were paid under a separate coverage provision in the
policy, Coverage Q - Medical Payments. R p. 46, and p. 70-71. After Farm Bureau made its
payments, it denied coverage for the underinsured motorist claim for the reason that neither Mrs.
Eisenman's estate, the personal representatives of the estate, nor Ms. Eisenman's adult children
were insureds as defined by the policy. R p. 70-71. In fact, Defendant adult children admitted
that they were not named insureds and were not living with their mother at the time of her death.
R p. 247.

After the motions for summary judgment were filed by the parties, District Judge Michael
McLaughlin conducted a hearing on the motions for summary judgment, Tr p. 5 - 37. Judge
McLaughlin ruled in his Memorandum Decision that the question, in the case, was a matter of
first impression in Idaho. He found the issue to be one of statutory construction of Idaho's
Wrongful Death Act, Idaho Code §5-311, and how the insurance policy interacts with the Act. R
p. 271.
Judge McLaughlin found that Defendant personal representatives of Ms. Eisenman's
estate brought this action on her behalf pursuant to Idaho Code §5-311. R p. 271. The district
court' decision then examined the language of the policy to see if Ms. Eisenman's personal
representatives were entitled to recover pursuant to Idaho Code §5-31l, and the decision
determined that they were so entitled. R p. 271. For its controlling authority, the district court
relied upon a 1990 Alabama case, Sprouse v. Hawk, 574 So.2d 754, 756-57 (Ala. 1990). The
district court also relied upon the Alabama Wrongful Death Statute, Ala. Code 1975 § 6-5-410,
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which allows only a personal representative to bring a wrongful death action against a negligent
tortfeasor. Id.; R p. 271.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

Whether the district court erred as a matter of law in finding that the personal

representatives of Ms. Eisenman's estate and her heirs, were entitled to recover damages from the
underinsured motorist part of Ms. Eisenman's Farm Bureau automobile insurance policy because
her personal representatives and her heirs were authorized by law to recover damages under the
po Hcy pursuant to Idaho' s Wrongful Death Act.
B. Whether Farm Bureau's uninsuredlunderinsured ["UM/UIM"] motorist policy provides
for the recovery of damages only to persons defined as insureds under the insuring agreement of the
underinsured motorist part of Ms. Eisenman's Farm Bureau automobile insurance policy.
C.

Whether the district court erred in finding that the personal representatives of Ms.

Eisenman's estate and her heirs were entitled to recover damages under the underinsured motorist
loss payable clause of Ms. Eisenman's Farm Bureau automobile insurance policy rather than under
the insuring clause.

III. ARGUMENT
A.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FINDING
THAT THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES OF MS. EISENMAN'S ESTATE
AND HER HEIRS, WERE ENTITLED TO RECOVER DAMAGES FROM THE
UNDERINSURED MOTORIST PART OF MS. EISENMAN'S FARM BUREAU
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICY BECAUSE THE PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVES AND HEIRS WERE AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO
RECOVER DAMAGES UNDER THE POLICY PURSUANT TO IDAHO'S
WRONGFUL DEATH ACT.
1. The Standard of Review and the Standard for Summary Judgment
a. The Standard of Review is Free Review.
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Summary judgment under I.R.c.P. 56(c) can be granted by a trial court when there
are no genuine issues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P .2d 1279, 1280
(Ct.App.1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, all controverted facts are to
be liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party. All reasonable inferences of fact
must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co.,
119 Idaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991); Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125
Idaho 872,874,876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct.App.1994). Additionally,
The burden of proving the absence of material facts is upon the moving
party. Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue,
the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show that a genuine issue of
material fact on the challenged element of the claim does exist. The
nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials
contained in the pleadings, but must come forward and produce evidence
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in the rules to set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. I.R.c.P. 56(e). (Citations
omitted).
Levinger v. Mercy Medical Center, Nampa, 139 Idaho 192,195,75 P.3d 1202,1205

(2003). Finally, this Court has stated: "When questions of law are presented, this Court
exercises free review and is not bound by findings of the district court, but is free to draw
its own conclusions from the evidence presented." Mutual of Enumclaw v. Box, 127
Idaho 851,852,908 P.2d 153, 154 (1995).
b. The Standard for Granting Summary Judgment is the Same as That
Used by the District Court Under I.R.c.P. 56(c).

When reviewing an order for summary judgment, the standard of review for this Court is
the same standard used by the district court in ruling on the motion. Watson v. Weick, 141 Idaho
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500, 504, 112 P.3d 788, 792 (2005). Summary judgment may be granted when the pleadings,
affidavits, and discovery documents before the court indicate no genuine issue of material fact
exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; I.R.C.P. 56(c); Baxter

v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263,267 (2000). The moving party carries the burden of
proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id.
When questions of law are presented on a motion for summary judgment, the court must
determine, "whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the prevailing party was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Doe v. City of Elk River, 144 Idaho 337, 338, 160 P.3d
1272, 1273 (2007). "If uncontroverted facts exist which lead to a definite disposition as a matter
of law, summary judgment is appropriate." G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514,
524,808 P.2d 851,861 (1991).
The district court found that there were no genuine issues of fact, but that the dispute
centered on how the language in the Farm Bureau underinsured motorist policy interacted with
Idaho's Wrongful Death Act, Idaho Code, § 5-311. R p. 271.

2.

The Legal Framework for Reviewing Insurance Policies

This Court follows several well established rules for the interpretation of insurance
policies. Insurance policies are interpreted the same as other contracts. If there is no ambiguous
language in the policy provisions, applicable to the facts of the case, the rules of contract
interpretation are followed. When ambiguous language in the applicable provisions is
encountered, special rules of interpretation are followed, and the policy is construed against the
insurer. Arreguin v. Farmers Insurance Co. of Idaho, 145 Idaho 459,461, 180 P.3d 489,500
(2006). If confronted with ambiguous language, the reviewing court must determine what a
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reasonable person would understand the language to be. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Mocaby, 133
Idaho 593,597,990 P.2d 1204, 1208 (1999).
A district court must construe the policy as a whole, not focusing on any isolated phrase.
Cascade Auto Glass, Inc. v. Farm Bureau Insurance Co., 141 Idaho 660, 663, 115 P.3d 751, 754

(2005). If the policy language is clear and unambiguous, then its coverage is determined as a
matter of law in accordance with the plain meaning of the words used. Id. 116 Idaho at 662, 115
P.3d at 753. If two or more reasonable, but conflicting interpretations may be derived from the
policy language, the language is ambiguous. Id., 141 Idaho at 663, 115 P.3d at 754.
Furthermore, every word and phrase in an insurance contract does not need to be defined
in the contract. Nat'l Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Dixon, 141 Idaho 537,540,
112 P.3d 825, 828 (2005). An ambiguity is not established merely because the parties present
differing interpretations to the court. Treasure Valley Transit v. Philadelphia Indem. Insurance
Co., 139 Idaho 925, 928,88 P.3d 744, 747 (2004).

Finally, where policy language is found to be unambiguous, the court is to construe the
policy as written, since the court will not construct or write a new policy for the parties, nor add
words to, "create or avoid liability." Purvis v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co., 142 Idaho
213,216, 127 P.3d 116, 119 (2005).
The district court did not find that the language in the Farm Bureau underinsured
motorist policy was ambiguous. R p. 270-273.

B.
F ARM BUREAU'S UNINSUREDIUNDERINSURED MOTORIST POLICY
PROVIDES FOR THE RECOVERY OF DAMAGES ONLY TO PERSONS
DEFINED AS INSUREDS UNDER THE INSURING AGREEMENT OF THE
UNDERINSURED MOTORIST PART OF MS. EISENMAN'S FARM BUREAU
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICY.
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1.
This case is governed by the version of the uninsured motorist act,
Idaho Code § 41-2502(1), in effect in 2007 and the language of the Farm
Bureau Policy.

Fann Bureau's underinsured motorist policy must be interpreted according to the
language in the policy and the version of Idaho Code § 41-2502(1) which was in effect at the
time of the accident in November 2007. See Appendix A. for the full text of Idaho Code § 41-

2502(1) in effect in November 2007. In 2007, Idaho required all automobile liability policies to
offer only uninsured motorist coverage, subject to written refusal by the named insured. Id. This
Court has held that there is no public policy governing underinsured motorist coverage, and the
provisions of the insurance policy govern when determining coverage. Erland v. Nationwide

Insurance Co., 136 Idaho 131, 133,30 P.3d 803, 288 (2001); Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho v. Buffa,
119 Idaho 345, 347, 806 P.2d 438,440 (1991) ("Underinsured coverage in this state is a matter
of contract law, not public policy.") Fetherston By and Through Featherston v. Allstate

Insurance. Co., 125 Idaho 840, 843,875 P.2d 973,940 (1987), n. 1., (Idaho's statutory scheme
does not mandate under insured motorist coverage).
Idaho's legislature required underinsured motorist coverage to be offered with uninsured
motorist coverage on January 1, 2009. So, the coverage afforded by the Farm Bureau
underinsured motorist coverage in Ms. Eisenman's policy in effect on the date of the accident
must be determined by rules governing contracts and the language of the policy itself. The
district court, in its decision, used the 2009 (current) version of Idaho Code § 41-2502(2) in its
decision, not the 2007 version of statute when underinsured motorist coverage was not required
to be offered. R p. 270.
As of January 5,2011 this Court has announced that there is a public policy in favor of
underinsured motorist coverage. Hill v. American Family Mut. Insurance Co., 150 Idaho 619,
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249 P.3d 812 (2011); see infra p. 14,. Farm Bureau had of course offered and Mrs. Eisenman had
contracted for underinsured motorist coverage before the effective date of the statute.

2.
Only Insureds, as defined in the Policy, can receive benefits under the
uninsured motorist coverage provisions.
Farm Bureau's underinsured motorist coverage has the following insuring agreement:

COVERAGE P-l- UNDERINSURED MOTORIST
We will pay damages which an insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner or
operator of an underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury sustained by an
insured and caused by an occurrence. The owner's or operator's liability for these
damages must arise from the ownership, maintenance or use of the underinsured motor
vehicle.
The following additional definitions apply to Coverages P & P-l:
1.

Insured means:
a.
You and any relative;
b.
Anyone occupying an insured vehicle; or
c.
Anyone occupying a nonowned vehicle while operated by you or your
relative.

Rp.44.
The bolded words above are defined in the policy.

DEFINITIONS APPLICABLE TO SECTION III
The following definitions apply to Section III.
Throughout this Section, we, us, and our mean the Company named in the Declarations.
You and you mean the person named in the Declarations and that person's spouse if a
resident of the same household. You and you also refer to a partnership, corporation,
limited liability company, estate, or trust named in the Declarations. The following
defined words appear in bold print in the policy.

Bodily injury means physical injury or death to a person.
Occurrence means an accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a
motor vehicle, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which results in
unexpected bodily injury or property damage during the policy period. All bodily
injury and property damage resulting from a common cause shall be considered the
result of one occurrence. . . .
9

Relative means a person related to you by blood, marriage or adoption who is a resident
of your household, including a ward or foster child.
R p. 20, 21.
The language of the Farm Bureau policy has previously been examined by the Idaho
Court of Appeals in Baker v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. of Idaho, Inc., 130 Idaho 415,
417,941 P.2d 1316, 1318 (Ct. App. 1997). Coverage P of the policy in that case was identical to
that of Ms. Eisenman's policy. It stated:
We will pay damages which an insured is legally entitled to recover from the
owner or operator of an ... underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury
sustained by an insured and caused by an occurrence.

Id.
Bodily injury in Baker v. Farm Bureau, as in this case, was defined to include death. Id.,
R p. 19. Insured was defined to include relatives living in the same household as the named
insured. The VIM coverage part of the Farm Bureau policy is unambiguous, and the district court
in this case did not find otherwise. Instead, the district court focused on the language in Idaho's
Wrongful Death Act which defined heirs who can recover under the Act. Defendants met the
definition of an heir in the Act. The district court then went to quote the VIM language in Ms.
Eisenman's policy which states:
We will pay damages which an insured is legally entitled to recover from the
owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury sustained by
an insured and caused by an occurrence.
R p. 273.
The district court completed its analysis with the following logic. The first premise is that
Idaho's Wrongful Death Act allows personal representatives to sue, on behalf of the statutory
heirs, the wrongdoer who caused the death. The next premise is that Defendants are personal
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representatives and heirs of Ms. Eisenman's estate. The next premise is that Farm Bureau's loss
payable clause, not the insuring agreement, states that "any amount due under this coverage"
may be paid "to a person authorized by law to receive such payment, or to a person who is
legally entitled to recover the damages which the payment represents." The next premise is that
Defendants as personal representatives and heirs are entitled to recover damages from a
wrongdoer under Idaho's Wrongful Death Act. The next premise, is that Farm Bureau's VIM
insuring agreement states, "We will pay damages which an insured is legally entitled to recover
from the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury sustained
by an insured and caused by an occurrence." Finally, the district court's logic concluded with
this statement:
The insurance policy in the case specifically provided insurance coverage for
Patricia Eisenman in the event of physical injury or death. Furthermore, the Defendants
are entitled to recover those damages pursuant to Idaho's Wrongful Death Act. Therefore,
the Court grants the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and denies the
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
R p. 272 - 273.

The district court's logic is flawed because it failed to first consider the definition of an
insured in the policy and then to apply that definition to Defendants who were making the VIM
claim for the death of Ms. Eisenman. It is agreed that Ms. Eisenman was the only named insured
in the policy. R p. 13. The policy went on to define the term, "relative", as a person related to the
named insured by blood, marriage, or adoption who is a resident of insured's household. R p. 21.
The term "insured" was further defined in the VMfUIM coverage as the named insured and any
relative. R p. 26. Putting the two definitions together, an insured can be the named insured or a
relative residing in the same household as the named insured. Defendants were neither named
insureds or were they relatives residing in the same household as their mother. If Ms. Eisenman
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wished to add her adult nonresident children to her policy, she could have done so by specifically
requesting the same, having Farm Bureau's underwriting rate the additional risk, and by paying
the additional premium.
The Farm Bureau policy agrees to pay damages to an insured who is legally entitled to
recover from the owner or operator of an underinsured vehicle. The policy does not agree to pay
damages to the estate of an insured or to the nonresident family members who are not named
insureds on the policy. The district court essentially held that: 1) because Idaho's Wrongful
Death Act allows defined family members to sue the tortfeasor who killed their parent; and 2) the
policy's loss payable clause allows payment of benefits to a person authorized by law to receive
such payment, or to a person who is legally entitled to recover the damages; then 3) the same
defined family members who could sue under the Wrongful Death Act should be allowed to
claim and collect damages from their parent's VIM policy. This result ignores the plain language
of the insuring agreement which limits recovery of VIM benefits to insureds in the policy. The
district court did what this Court has previously held courts should not do: create coverage in an
insurance policy where it did not exist. Lavey v. Regence BlueShield of Idaho, 139 Idaho 37, 41,
72 P.3d 877, 881 (2003).
In Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho v. Buffa, 119 Idaho 345, 347, 806 P.2d 438, 440 (1991), the

issue was whether an insurer could impose an offset requirement in its VIM coverage of the
payment of the tortfeasor's liability insurance against the limits of the insured's VIM coverage.
Claimants argued that the insurer's construction of the offset requirement in the underinsured
motorist provisions of that policy were void as against public policy. The Court stated:
This argument ignores the fact that our statutes do not require an automobile insurer to
include underinsured vehicle coverage in its policies or even to offer this coverage to its
insureds. Vnderinsured coverage in this state is a matter of contract law, not public
policy. Scarlett, 116 Idaho at 822, 780 P.2d at 144; Meckert v. Transamerica Ins. Co.,
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108 Idaho 597, 701 P.2d 217 (1985); Blackburn v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 108
Idaho 85, 697 P.2d 425 (1985).
Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho v. Buffa, 119 Idaho 345,347,806 P.2d 438, 440 (1991).

Because underinsured motorist coverage was not required at the time of the accident in
this case, the Buffa decision that underinsured coverage in Idaho is a matter of contract law is
still good law as applied to this case. Because underinsured coverage is a matter of contract law
in Idaho, this Court must focus on the plain language of the policy. Expanding the language of
the Wrongful Death Act to rewrite the insurance contract to create coverage where none existed
is contrary to this Court's prior rulings.
It should be kept in mind that insurance is basically a transfer of risk. In exchange for
payment of premium, an insurance company is willing to take the risk of some form of
unfortunate loss for specifically identified insureds for certain events. This analysis of risk is the
essential part of an insurance company's ability to pay losses and survive as an entity. This basic
concept, therefore, forms the necessity for asking questions of prospective insureds as to how
many people live in a household, drive vehicles, how many vehicles are there, and what is the
driving history of the various individuals. The number of individuals who are insureds increases
the risk of eventual accidents. An insurance company can appropriately adjust premium or
simply choose not to write the business. See, generally, Robert E. Keeton & Alan 1. Widiss,
Insurance Law, A Guide to Fundamental Principles, Legal Doctrines and Commercial Practices,
§ 1.3(b), at 10-12 (1988), for a discussion of the factors involved in risk transference.

Under the district court's analysis in its decision, the number of individuals who could
arguably make claims pursuant to the Wrongful Death Act becomes quiet large depending upon
how many relatives there are and how many claimants have received substantial support from the
decedent. By increasing the potential number of claimants beyond the number for which
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premium was calculated, the district court has expanded Idaho law such that insurers will
necessarily have to increase their premiums for VMlUIM coverage.
Farm Bureau maintains that its VIM policy's insuring agreement limits the persons who
can obtain VIM benefits to those persons who meet the definition of an insured in the policy.
Applying the definition of an insured in the policy to the facts of this case, Defendants adult
children of Ms. Eisenman have admitted that they did not live with their mother at the time of
her death. R p. 247,268. Neither the Estate of Ms. Eisenman or the other named Defendants
were named insureds in Ms. Eisenman's policy. Id. Therefore, the only insured in Ms.
Eisenman's policy was Ms. Eisenman herself, the named insured.
The district court agreed with Farm Bureau that none of Defendants were either named
insureds or qualified as defined insureds in the policy. R p. 268. Farm Bureau maintains that the
language of the insuring agreement governs this case and VIM damages can only be paid to an
insured, who "is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an underinsured
motor vehicle because of bodily injury sustained by an insured and caused by an occurrence."
Coverage P-l Vnderinsured Motorist, above; R p. 44. Defendants are not insureds and cannot
recover VIM damages under the Farm Bureau policy.
There has been only one Idaho Supreme Court case involving the declaration of any
public policy for VIM insurance policies; Hill v. American Family Mut. Insurance Co., 150
Idaho 619, 249 P.3d 812 (2011). The Hill case saw this Court invalidating an exhaustion clause
in the insurer's VIM policy. The majority found that the change in the statutory language
requiring all auto insurers to offer VIM coverage was not retroactive. Id. 249 P.3d at 820, 821.
This Court's majority opinion did invalidate the exhaustion clause because it violated the public
policy of Idaho by diluting "Idahoans' protection against underinsured drivers and to prevent
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insureds from collecting legitimate claims." Id. 249 P.3d at 823. There has been no claim or
argument in the present case that Farm Bureau's UIM insuring agreement or its definition of an
insured is contrary to public policy. Unlike the exhaustion clause in Hill, which conditioned
receipt of benefits on the payment of the policy limits of the tortfeasor, Farm Bureau's insuring
agreement tracks the language of the UIM statute. The Farm Bureau insuring agreement does not
expand coverage beyond insureds defined in the policy. There is no violation of public policy in
the Farm Bureau policy.
Furthermore, contracts are to be interpreted according to the law at the time the contract
is executed. Smith v. Idaho Hasp. Serv., Inc., 89 Idaho 499,503,406 P.2d 696,698 (1965) as
cited in Hill v. American Family Mut. Insurance Co., 150 Idaho 619,249 P.3d 812,821 (2011).
Therefore, the insuring agreement in the Farm Bureau policy is to be applied as written.
This Court should focus on the plain and unambiguous language of the UIM insuring
agreement in the Farm Bureau Farm and Ranch policy. It is the policy language which governs
the extent of the coverage, not Idaho's Wrongful Death Act, Idaho Code §5-311. The Wrongful
Death Act's created a cause of action for the surviving, defined heirs of a decedent. The
Wrongful Death Act did not and does not modify the Farm Bureau VIM policy language and
create new insureds which were not defined in the policy. This is essentially what the district
court did in its decision; it created a new category of insureds not previously identified.
Farm Bureau maintains that the first requirement for coverage in the policy has been
overlooked by the district court's decision. An insured must be able to recover the damages. Not
the insured's estate; not the insured's personal representative; not the insured's adult children
who do not live with insured. The insured in this case was Ms. Eisenman, who lived alone. Her
adult children who live in Idaho would have been able to have become insureds under her policy
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if they had been acceptable to underwriting guidelines and paid the additional premium. But they
did not pay additional premium. Her adult children were not defined as the third category of
insureds, i.e., relatives living with the named insured in the same residence. Farm Bureau wrote
the UIM policy language only to cover claims made by insureds. Farm Bureau did not write the
policy to cover any possible third parties who might also have legal claims under the Wrongful
Death Act.
Had Ms. Eisenman been severely injured, only she would have a cause of action against
the tortfeasor. She would then be able to make a UIM claim on her policy for damages not
covered by the tortfeasor's liability insurance. Her adult children would have no cause of action
against the tortfeasor for the injuries received by Ms. Eisenman in the accident. This is because
her adult children were not insureds as defined by the policy. By tragic happenstance, Ms.
Eisenman died of her injuries. Under Idaho law, any claim she had against the tortfeasor ended
with her death. Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210, 796 P.2d 87 (1990). Since Idaho has
passed a Wrongful Death Act, Idaho Code §5-311, Ms. Eisenman's adult children now have a
. cause of action for their loss of society and other potential damages against the tortfeasor for her
wrongful death. Just because Defendants now have a cause of action against the tortfeasor, does
not automatically mean that they have a claim against their mother's VIM policy. The existence
of any claim against Ms. Eisenman's VIM policy is now governed by the language in the policy
itself. That language limits recovery of VIM benefits to insureds.
Defendants have argued in the district court that once Ms. Eisenman died, and her estate
was created, the estate in effect became Ms. Eisenman. Therefore, Ms. Eisenman, through her
estate, was legally entitled to recover damages from the tortfeasor. R p. 89; Tr p. 18, L. 14-17.
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Idaho's Wrongful Death Act allows either the heirs of the decedent or the decedent's personal
representative on behalf of the heirs to bring the action against the tortfeasor. (emphasis added)
Idaho's Wrongful Death Act, Idaho Code §5-311, states:
(1) When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, his or
her heirs or personal representatives on their behalf may maintain an action for
damages against the person causing the death, or in case of the death of such wrongdoer,
against the personal representative of such wrongdoer, whether the wrongdoer dies before
or after the death of the person injured. If any other person is responsible for any such
wrongful act or neglect, the action may also be maintained against such other person, or
in case of his or her death, his or her personal representatives. In every action under this
section, such damages may be given as under all the circumstances of the case as may be
just. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Idaho Wrongful Death Act allows certain defined heirs to file an action for recovery
of damages for wrongful death from the tortfeasor. However, to allow either Ms. Eisenman's
estate or her heirs, who are not defined as insureds in her UIM policy, and who have not paid
premiums for the coverage, to recover what amounts to wrongful death damages against Farm
Bureau, amounts to changing the UIM coverage into an accidental death policy. Defendants
could have easily have become additional named insureds on Ms. Eisenman's auto policy in
which case they would be able to collect the UIM benefits because they would have paid the
additional premium to become named insureds. That did not happen in our fact situation.

C.
THE DISTRICT COURT'S RELIANCE ON ALABAMA CASE LAW AND
ST ATUTES IS MISPLACED AS BOTH THE FACTS AND LAW ARE
DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THOSE OF THE PRESENT CASE.
The facts of the present case present a matter of first impression for this Court. R p. 270.
The district court recognized this and decided to look to the law of the State of Alabama for
guidance in its ruling. R p. 271. The district court relied upon the case of Sprouse v. Hawk, 574
So.2d 754 (Ala. 1990). In Sprouse, a wife and mother, Mrs. Hawk, living with her husband and
two minor sons, died in an auto accident with an uninsured motorist. Her surviving husband had
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four State Farm auto policies of which Mrs. Hawk was an insured. One of her sons had a State
Farm policy of which Mrs. Hawk was also an insured. The State Farm insuring clause read:
We [the insurer] will pay damages for bodily injury an insured is legally entitled to
collect from the owner or driver of an uninsured motor vehicle. The bodily injury must be
caused by an accident arising out of the operation, maintenance or use of an uninsured
motor vehicle.
[d. 574 So.2d 757, n. 3. The payment or loss payable clause stated that, "We will pay any amount

due: 1. To the insured; 2. To a parent or guardian if the insured is a minor or an incompetent
person; 3. To the surviving spouse; or 4. At our option, to a person authorized by law to receive
such a payment." [d. 574 So.2d at 755.
The surviving spouse/husband made a claim against all policies for uninsured motorist
benefits. State Farm paid the limits of all the policies to decedent's husband. The two sons
intervened arguing that the Alabama Wrongful Death Statute, Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-410,
governed the distribution of damages in wrongful death cases, including uninsured motorist
payments in a wrongful death'case. The Alabama Supreme Court stated the issue to be: "how
uninsured or underinsured motorist insurance proceeds are to be distributed when they are being
paid as the result of the death of an insured." Sprouse, 574 So.2d at 756.
The issue in Sprouse is clearly different from that in our case as are the facts. The Hawk
family was living together. The issue was the order of distribution of the UM benefit, not if any
of the claimants were insureds under the policies. Also, Alabama's Wrongful Death Statue is
unique in the United States because only the personal representative can bring the action against
the negligent party, and the damages must be paid according to the statute. The Alabama
Supreme Court agreed that the damages were to be distributed according to the statute. Sprouse,
574 So.2d at 756. Thus, the husband and his two sons shared in the uninsured motorist benefits.
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The Alabama Supreme Court further stated that but for the Wrongful Death Statute, there
could be no damages of any kind recovered for wrongful death because no right to damages for
wrongful death existed at common law. Id. at 757. The court also cited the uninsured motorist
statute which allowed damages for wrongful death. But, note that the husband and sons of
decedent were still insureds under the uninsured motorist policies.
The Sprouse facts are not the same as those in our case where Defendants, adult children
of Ms. Eisenman, who were not living with her and were not insureds as defined in the policy,
are claiming damages under her policy. Ms. Eisenman's insuring clause stated: "We will pay
damages which an insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an
underinsured motor vehicle. . .. " (Emphasis supplied). R p. 44. The Farm Bureau policy can
and did limit payment of UIM benefits to those persons defined as insureds in the policy. The
Alabama Supreme Court did not need to consider the insuring agreement in the State Farm
policies because surviving insureds were making the claims against the policy. The Alabama
court looked only to the loss payable clause which, after coverage had been determined under the
insuring agreement, gave the insurer options on how to pay the benefits. This clause was
important because the husband had been paid all of the benefits. Under Alabama's Wrongful
Death Statute, the benefits had to be paid according to the statute to all of the heirs.
The Alabama Supreme Court found that Mrs. Hawk, and not her husband or sons was the
true insured under the State Farm policies. Her husband would not be able to bring a wrongful
death action in his individual capacity, only in the capacity of an executor of the estate. Sprouse
574 So.2d 754, 757. Lastly note that all of the State Farm policies provided that an insured was
also defined as, "5. Any person entitled to recover damages because of bodily injury to an
insured under 1 through 4 above." Paragraphs 1through 4 referred to the other definitions of an
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insured in the policy. Those were: "1. The first person named in the declarations; 2. His or her
spouse; 3. Their relatives; and 4. Any other person while occupying: .... " Sprouse 574 So.2d
755, n 2. All of members of the Hawk family met the definition of an insured in the broad
definition contained in the State Farm policies. The above paragraph 5. of the definition of an
insured in the State Farm policy is also not included in the definition of an insured in Ms.
Eisenman's Farm Bureau policy. Sprouse is distinguished on both the law and the facts from the
present case.
The Sprouse case cited the case of Satzinger v. Satzinger, 156 N.J.Super. 215, 383 A.2d
753 (1978) as a similar case. In that case, the facts were that a mother's minor daughter was
killed while she was a passenger in a vehicle driven by an uninsured driver. Her daughter was
covered under the uninsured motorist coverage of mother's auto policy. The daughter lived with
her mother. Mother sued the driver and obtained a judgment. She then made a claim for damages
under her own uninsured motorist policy. Her auto insurer settled with her making a payment
from her uninsured motorist coverage. The decedent's father, mother's ex-husband, who did not
live with the mother and was not an insured under her policy, then made a claim for a share of
the settlement mother made with her insurer. One of the holdings in the case was that the
uninsured motorist statute was "intended to provide indemnity for damages resulting from an
insured's wrongful death caused by an uninsured motorist, payable to whatever person or
persons may be entitled to bring an action under the New Jersey Wrongful Death Act." Id. at
223,383 A.2d at 757, as quoted in Sprouse, 574 So.2d 754, 757.
As in Alabama, only the estate's administrator had the right to maintain the wrongful
death action in New Jersey; the mother had no individual right to maintain a wrongful death
action. The divorced father, as an heir under the intestate succession statute, was entitled to share
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of the insurance settlement proceeds. Satzinger v. Satzinger, 156 N.J. Super. 215, 219, 383 A.2d
753, 755 (1978).
The facts in Satzinger are also distinguishable from the facts in the present case. As in
Sprouse, the case involved uninsured motorist coverage which was required to be offered with an

auto liability policy, not an underinsured motorist policy such as Farm Bureau's. The New Jersey
Wrongful Death Act only allowed an estate's administrator to bring the wrongful death action.
Heirs had no right to bring their own wrongful death actions. The mother's receipt of the
insurance benefit was dependent on and the result of the judgment in the wrongful death case
where the driver was found to be negligent in causing daughter's death. Satzinger, 156 N.J.
Super. 215, 222, 383 A.2d 753, 756. The policy benefits had to be shared among the heirs. The
mother in the case was also living with her daughter, and daughter was an insured. Also, the
New Jersey court declared that uninsured motorist coverage was intended to provide indemnity
for damages from an insured's wrongful death, and payable to "whatever person or persons may
be entitled to bring an action under the New Jersey Wrongful Death Act .... " Satzinger, 156
N.J.Super. 215, 223, 383 A.2d 753, 756-57 (citations omitted).
Both the Alabama and New Jersey cases dealt with required uninsured motorist coverage
for which a state policy had been declared and had wrongful death statutes significantly different
than Idaho's version. In the present case, underinsured motorist coverage was not required at the
time of the accident. The language of the Farm Bureau policy must govern this Court's decision.
The Farm Bureau underinsured motorist insuring agreement limits payment to insureds.
Defendants making the claim against Ms. Eisenman's policy are not insureds. Also, the
Alabama and New Jersey courts relied on decisions from other jurisdictions in holding that they
would only look to their respective wrongful death statutes to see who could bring an action to
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recover under the uninsured motorist insurance policy. E.g., Satzinger, 156 N.J. Super. 215, 22122,383 A.2d 753, 756-57. No detailed analysis of the definition of an insured was undertaken in
Satzinger.

This lack of detailed analysis of the insuring agreement is a critical element of appeal in
the present case. The Satzinger court did state that a fund recovered under the Wrongful Death
Act is not part of the decedent's estate. Id., 56 N.J. Super. 215, 224, 383 A.2d 753,757. In that
respect, the analysis is different from Defendants' arguments that Ms. Eisenman was entitled to
recover her children's wrongful death damages pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-311. R p. 271.
Although the district court appeared to find that as long as there is someone who could recover
under Idaho's Wrongful Death Act, they can also recover under decedent insured's UIM policy,
even though that person is not defined as an insured. Under this analysis, any distant relative
could claim that insured decedent was supplying substantial support to them and then make a
claim. Idaho Code § 5-311", infra at p. 15-16.
The district court's decision noted that the Farm Bureau policy's loss payable clause
allowed the payment of any amount due to be paid "[t]o a person authorized by law to receive
such payment or to a person who is legally entitled to recover the damages which the payment
represents." in conjunction with the persons who can bring a wrongful death action that
determined if UIM benefits were to be paid. R p. 268. Actually, this provision in the policy is
part of the Conditions Applicable to Coverages P & P-l [the UMlUIM coverage.] R p. 45. The
conditions also include the limits of liability, nons tacking of limits, reduction of amounts
payable, hit-and-run accident, mediation, arbitration, trust agreement, nonbinding judgment, and
interest in addition to payment of loss. R p. 45-46. The critical distinction here is that as a
"condition", the actual payment of the loss does not even arise unless there is coverage for the
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claim and the person making the claim. The loss payable clause is not part of the insuring
agreement. The loss payable clause does not expand coverage, it simply tells the insured and the
company to whom to write the check.

D.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

There are of course two basic types of wrongful death acts in the United States. In
Alabama and New Jersey, jurisdictions relied upon by the District Court, the wrongful death
statute requires that the only proper person to bring a wrongful death action is the personal
representative. In Idaho, however, wrongful death actions are individual to each heir who can
make a claim against the tortfeasor. In this case, reliance upon Alabama and New Jersey for
integration of the wrongful death statute to underinsured motorist coverage is misplaced. The
uninsured motorist policies in those two states were specifically written to comply with their
state's statutory framework in UMIUIM wrongful death cases. The district court's decision by
incorporating as an insured all persoris that could possibly make a claim under Idaho's Wrongful
Death Act, has rewritten the insurance contract, ignored the concept of risk analysis and
underwriting, and effectively changes the UIM coverage into a second automobile accidental
death policy.
Farm Bureau's grant of coverage pursuant to the underinsured motorist protection, which
includes the definition of the insured, is unambiguous and should be upheld. The analysis of this
type of insurance policy is not complex. It begins with first reviewing the grant of coverage, or
insuring agreement, which includes defined terms and identification of insureds. Step two is to
identify an event or occurrence that activates the coverage. Step three, is the review of the policy
provisions as to the nature of the incident and what can or cannot be paid under the terms of the
policy. Step four, after coverage has been determined, is the loss payable clause condition. It tells

23

the insured and the insurance company to whom payment can be made. Depending upon policy
provisions, this loss payable clause may identify persons other than insureds. For example,
medical providers, lien holders, the fire department for rescue, or it may be individuals or heirs.
The loss payable clause does not create coverage; it simply identifies who gets the check.
For the above reasons, Appellant Farm Bureau respectfully requests that the Court
reverse the district court's decision granting Respondent's Summary Judgment Motion and find
that Farm Bureau's underinsured motorist policy, as written, shall be upheld.
DATED this

~ day of August 2011.
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES

By
Rodney . Saetrum
Attorne s for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

~day of August 2011, I caused a true and correct

copy of the foregoing document to be served by the method indicated below and addressed to:

Michael W. Moore
Brady J. Hall
Moore & Ellia, LLP
1001 W. Idaho Suite 400
P.O. Box 6756
Boise, Idaho 83707

____ u.S. Mail
)(
Hand Delivery
____ Overnight Mail
____ Facsimile

24

APPENDIX A- Idaho Code § 41-2502
Idaho Code § 41-2502. Uninsured motorist coverage for automobile insurance. -

No policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death
suffered by any natural person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor
vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle
registered or principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental
thereto, in limits for bodily injury or death as set forth in section 49-117, Idaho Code, as
amended from time to time, under provisions approved by the director of the department of
insurance, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover
damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury,
sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom. The named insured shall have the right
to reject such coverage, which rejection must be in writing; and provided further, such coverage
need not be provided in or supplemental to a renewal policy where the named insured had
rejected the coverage in connection with a policy previously issued to him by the same insurer.
[I.e., § 41-2502, as added by 1967, ch. 61, § 1, p. 124; amended 1988, ch. 265, § 572, p. 549.]
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APPENDIX B - Idaho Code § 5-311
Idaho Code § 5-311. Suit for wrongful death by or against heirs or personal
representatives - Damages. - (1) When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or
neglect of another, his or her heirs or personal representatives on their behalf may maintain an
action for damages against the person causing the death, or in case of the death of such
wrongdoer, against the personal representative of such wrongdoer, whether the wrongdoer dies
before or after the death of the person injured. If any other person is responsible for any such
wrongful act or neglect, the action may also be maintained against such other person, or in case
of his or her death, his or her personal representatives. In every action under this section, such
damages may be given as under all circumstances of the case as may be just.
(2)
For the purposes of subsection (1) of this section, and subsection (2) of section 5327, Idaho Code, "heirs" means:
(a)
Those persons who would be entitled to succeed to the property of the decedent
according to the provisions of subsection (22) of section 15-1-201, Idaho Code.
(b) Whether or not qualified under subsection (2)(a) of this section, the decedent's
spouse, children, stepchildren, parents, and, when partly or wholly dependent on the decedent for
support or services, any blood relatives and adoptive brothers and sisters. It includes the
illegitimate child of a mother, but not the illegitimate child of the father unless the father has
recognized a responsibility for the child's support.
1.

"Support" includes contributions in kind as well as money.

2.
"Services" means tasks, usually of a household nature, regularly performed by the
decedent that will be a necessary expense to the heirs of the decedent. These services may vary
according to the identity of the decedent and heir and shall be determined under the particular
facts of each case.
(c)
Whether or not qualified under subsection (2)(a) or (2)(b) of this section, the
putative spouse of the decedent, if he or she was dependent on the decedent for support or
services. As used in this subsection, "putative spouse" means the surviving spouse of a void or
voidable marriage who is found by the court to have believed in good faith that the marriage to
the decedent was valid.
(d)
Nothing in this section shall be construed to change or modify the definition of
"heirs" under any other provision of law.
[I.C., § 5-311, as added by 1984, ch. 158, § 3, p. 385; amended 2010, ch. 349, § 1. P. 911]

26

